Pest And Swot Analysis Of Australia

Pest And Swot Analysis Of Australia Sydney is the largest city in Australia with a population of 22,000 in central area and 4 million people in greater Sydney area. It is situated on Australias south-east coast and is one of the most multicultural cities in the world and is a major destination for immigrants to Australia. 1.2 The Product Kluang Station Kluang Station is known as the Coffee Shop Canteen. Going abroad for further expansion and growth for the first time may be challenging as there are limitations to it. The existence of rules and regulations for venturing into the Australian food and beverage market require that they be critically looked at as it is crucial for Kluang Station to understand and abide them. 2.0 Market Audit SWOT Analysis PEST Analysis A recent international comparative study, Doing Business in 2008, found Australia has the ninth most business friendly regulations in the world, this means that the regulatory environment in the economy is conducive to the operation of business. Political The government and regulatory institutions are reliable, transparent, impartial and internationally competitive, thus providing investors with a safe and secure business framework. Political Risk One of the main issues to be discussed is the concern of the political risk within a country. In this case, concerns of the possibility that political decisions such as expropriation of profits, events such as wars, terrorism, and insurrection in the host country will negatively affect the business climate. Political System Three political parties dominate the Australian political system: The Liberal Party (LP) nominally representing urban business interests, and its smaller Coalition partner. The Nationals nominally representing rural interests are the more conservative parties. The Australian Labor Party (ALP) nominally represents workers, trade unions, and left-of-center groups. All political groups are tied by tradition to welfare programs. Over the last decade, Australia has increased assistance to families while imposing obligations on those receiving unemployment benefits and disability pensions. Legal System Australias legal system is based on the English System of legislative statutes and common law similar to that of Malaysia. Therefore, depending upon the type of investment proposed, an overseas investor in Australia would need to have regard to the laws and regulations of one or more of the Federal, State, Territory or Local Governments. With regards to the opening of Kluang Station in Sydney, the Federal Government has power in most areas concerning the national economy including income tax, exchange controls and foreign investment in corporations and land assets. Economical Australia has an enviable, strong economy with a per capita GDP on par with the four dominant West European economies. Healthy business and consumer confidence and high export prices for raw materials and agricultural products are fueling the economy, particularly in mining states. According to the data and products produced by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) the current unemployment rate is 4.4 which are known to be one of the lowest rates in the world Sociocultural i. Communication Australians are very direct in the way they communicate, There is often an element of humor, often self-deprecating, in their speech. Language English is the national language. Australian English is a major variety of the language, with its own distinctive accent and vocabulary some of which has found its way into Standard English. All documentation are written in English, these make it easy for Kluang Station to venture into Sydney. ii. Dining With the emphasis of multiculturalism, many other cuisines have influenced the Australian food culture such as the Asian foods formerly brought up by the settlers. Technological A combination of world-class information and communications technology (ICT) is adaptable across all Australian industry sectors providing an excellent environment for investors. E-readiness is a measure of a countrys information and communications technology and the ability of businesses and consumers to use ICT to their advantage. One benefit of this is the application of mobile technologies. The service industry, more specifically restaurants, has initiated exploiting the benefits of mobile technology. For instance, the benefits of using personal digital assistants (PDAs) in a restaurant have been explored. The findings indicated that the use of such technology has increased efficiency and accuracy, speedier service, better usability, and enhanced reputation. Telecommunication Sydney has a world class telecommunications infrastructure. Australian domestic networks consist of fiber-optic, wireless, and satellite system. Fiber-optic cables are the predominant technology allowing speedy internet access. Transportation Sydney is well equipped with public transport ranging from buses, taxis, to monorails and trains. There are also catamarans and ferries that ferry people from the main island to Manly Island located across Sydney harbour. Besides that, the airport is located close to the city, about a half an hour drive by motorway. 3.0 Target Market The restaurants target market will consist primarily of local residential customers ranging in age from 21 to 45 and local businesses. The main customers to be targeted would be office workers and tourists. This is due to the fact that most children would be at school and family outings happen on weekends as parents and children are free from obligations. Objectives Below are the objectives that are to be achieved via the marketing plan for Kluang Stations expansion into the Australian food and beverage market: i. Expand the market for local Malaysian delicacies such as Roti Bakar, Hainanese chicken rice, Ipoh White coffee and The Tarik ii. Expand the growth potential of Kluang Station by venturing into a new international market. Marketing Plan 5.1 Mode of entry 5.2 Product 5.3 Price First step for going global, Kluang Station is aware that price becomes increasingly important as a competitive tool. The manager is responsible for setting and controlling the price of the goods and services provided. In Kluang Station, the prices of food and drinks served are in about the range of $2 to $15. 5.3.1 Customary Mark-ups There are costs that will be incurred in the business that will lead to increments of the pricings. The main costs from the fixed rate include the renting, utility, and electricity of the restaurant in Sydney. Also, the charging of labor, that costs AUS$5 per hour.Part of the government regulations, Kluang Station must comply with the application of GST (tax charges) on total items sold. 5.4 Place Kluang Station will be located at Newtown NSW. The reason this particular address was chosen was due to the reputation of the street. Locals know it as a dining area that offers a variety of different foods to cater to any palette. It will be fitted will old kopitiam furniture; wooden stools and chairs, marble top tables, which will be flown in from Malaysia. To add to the ambiance, old Chinese opera music will be played softly in the background. 5.5 Promotion As there are many forms of advertising in Australia, Kluang Station would take this advantage to become recognize in the market. Since they are new in the market, Kluang Station would want to be established however within their planned budget. One way to advertise the existence of Kluang Station is through newspaper as it is one of the lowest costs for advertising. Since the target markets are potential drivers in Sydney, this could be the best way to reach to them. 5.6 Human Resource Kluang Station will need to employ several workers; cooks, waiters/waitresses, cleaners, cashiers, a manager, and two supervisors. Hiring will be done from the local community by taking out an advertisement in the local paper and using local job placement agencies. 5.6.1 Employer-employee relations There are employer employee agreements whereby this is registered with the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission, covering an employees working arrangements, pay and conditions. The employer employee agreements have been designed to provide appropriate protections and choice for both employees and employers. 5.6.2 Salaries and benefits Working in Australia gets the benefit of a flex working time. The salary of every employee is in proportion to their work loads. It seemed to have been above the standard scale and this is why many seek to land in the Australia shores. Aside from the filthy competitive salaries and benefits, they can enjoy luxurious fringe benefits. Budget 6.1 Five year financial project and assumption The following pages showcase the budget profits/ lost statement and estimates projected income statement. Based on our assumption, Kluang station will be making a profit throughout the 5 coming years

Teaching Ethics

School for scandal? Business schools turn their attention to ethics education This case examines the role of the business school in encouraging corruption in business, and looks at the potential impacts that business ethics training might have on students. It offers the opportunity to explore the significance of the individual and their education and experience for understanding ethical decision-making. It also provides a context for investigating the specific role, purpose, and impact of business ethics courses on business behaviour.When it turns out that the key figures in some of the most infamous cases of fraud and corruption in business are alumni from leading business schools, it is perhaps not surprising that the business schools themselves might come in for some criticism. After all, if people like Andrew Fastow, the convicted chief financial officer at Enron, or his boss Jeffrey Skilling, could have got MBAs from two of America’s premier business schools (Northwestern and Harvard, respectively) and , then it is inevitable that questions will be raised about what kinds of principles and practices business school students are being taught.In the last few years, a number of business gurus and commentators have publicly condemned business schools in general, and MBA programmes in particular, for their perpetuation of ‘misguided’ amoral theories and techniques, and the lack of attention to ethics in the curriculum.For example, Henry Mintzberg, the Canadian management expert has famously condemned the MBA model, suggesting that it ‘trains the wrong people in the wrong ways with the wrong consequences’, whilst Sumantra Ghoshal, the late London Business School professor has argued that the ‘worst excesses of recent management practices have their roots in a set of ideas that have emerged from business-school academics over the last 30 years. Ghoshal’s ire is directed to typical theories taught at business schools s uch as agency theory and Porter’s ‘5 forces’ model, which he claims perpetuate an idea that everyone is self-interested, managers cannot be trusted, business is a zero-sum game, and shareholder value is the only legitimate aim of business. The perpetuation of such assumptions, he suggests, leaves business school students devoid of any sense of moral responsibility. These criticisms have received a lot of attention in academic debates, but have also been readily recounted in the media and the business community.For instance The Economist ran a 2005 article headlined ‘Business schools stand accused of being responsible for much that is wrong with corporate management today’ which brought the arguments from Ghoshal, Mintzberg, and others to a wider audience – albeit in a context where the magazine rather predictably mounted a strong defence. After all, as The Economist argued, there are plenty of examples of corporate crooks who have not had a bu siness school education, so there are clearly other aspects to consider too.Nevertheless, whatever else the debate has done, it has certainly helped refocus the attention of business schools on their curricula, and especially on the provision of courses on ethics and social responsibility. At one level, this debate is simply about whether more business schools should be encouraged to introduce such courses into the curriculum. Whilst some schools have long included ethics in their curricula, others have tended to focus more on areas such as strategy, innovation, marketing and finance, whilst others have even dropped ethics courses due to low enrolments or political manoeuvring by sceptical colleagues.As one Wall Street Journal article put it, ‘MBA students and professors bristle at ethics requirements. Some faculty members resent being forced to squeeze ethics lessons into an already jam-packed syllabus, while students grumble that ethics classes tend to be preachy and philoso phical. ’ In this context, the evidence on the scale of ethics teaching is revealing. A recent survey of US schools found that 34 per cent required an ethics course at undergraduate level whilst only 25 per cent did so on MBA degrees.In Europe, the figures are if anything a little lower for compulsory courses, but more than 50 per cent of business schools report having an optional module on ethics or responsibility at undergraduate level and more than 30 per cent at masters level. Essentially, though, most business students can still complete a degree having had hardly any exposure to these subjects in the classroom – a situation that some are now trying to change. One development comes from the US, where a long running campaign by business ethics professors has been trying to make courses on ethics and responsibility compulsory for business students.Over 200 professors offered support to the campaign, but the AACSB (the body responsible for accrediting business degree programmes) appears, so far, to be unconvinced. A recent redraft of their guidelines for accreditation did not bow to the campaigners’ demands, and business ethics remains outside of their list of accredited subjects. Diane Swanson and Bill Frederick, the campaign leaders responded by condemning the AACSB’s arguments for excluding ethics as ‘desperate and out of date against the backdrop of unprecedented corporate scandals, increased public distrust of business, and a virtual sea change in corporate governance. However, some leading schools have moved towards greater attention to ethics. Harvard Business School, for instance, introduced a compulsory course on ‘Leadership and Corporate Accountability’ for all first year students in 2004 – a development that the school claimed represented ‘the most far-reaching course we’ve ever introduced on this subject’. In Europe, the situation is also changing, and in fact there appears to be significantly more support than in the US from European accrediting bodies.The Association of MBAs for example, has issued new criteria for the accreditation of MBA programmes that stipulate that the curriculum ‘should pay attention to ethical and social issues’, while the European Foundation for Management Development (EFMD) is also considering ways to integrate CSR into its EQUIS accreditation. New academic departments and centres have also sprung up in universities to lead ethics and responsibility teaching, such as the Business and Society Management department at Rotterdam School of Management and the International Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility in Nottingham University Business School.Whilst there is still a long way to go before schools successfully infuse ethics education across all of their courses, such developments certainly point to an increased emphasis over the past decade. Ethics and corporate responsibility feature far more prominently in the prospectuses of business schools than they did even a few years ago. Questions remain though about how ethics should best be integrated into the curriculum, and even whether exposure to the subject really has a positive effect on the decisions made by managers.While some maintain that a stand alone course on ethics is necessary to develop a suitable understanding of the subject and to consolidate its importance on the curriculum, others argue that this raises the prospects of generating an ‘ethics ghetto’ unconnected to mainstream business subjects such as finance and marketing. And the jury is still out on just how much of an effect any form of ethics training is likely to have on individuals. Various objections have been raised over the years, including the suggestion that students’ morality is already fixed and cannot be improved, and the accusations that ethics teaching is abstract, mbiguous, subjective, and little more than indoctrination from self-r ighteous ideologues. Of course, the extent to which some of these accusations are true will vary from course to course, and on the goals of any specific programme. In the main, evidence suggests that courses are rather better at enhancing students’ recognition of ethical issues, stimulating their moral imagination, and developing their analytical skills rather than improving students’ moral development or changing their values.As one business ethics professor puts it, ‘I do not want to teach moral standards; I want to teach a method of moral reasoning through complex issues so that students can apply the moral standards they have. ’ This highlights another growing debate among business ethics professors about the very purpose of business ethics education – and even what a business ethics course should consist of. Whilst one camp retains belief in the established practice of teaching moral philosophy to develop better normative thinking among student s, other camps have started to emerge.Some business school professors see more need to focus on practical management concerns, such as managing the corporate reputation or preventing accounting fraud, whilst others point to the need to understand ethics within wider social, political, and economic structures. One recent business ethics textbook (by Jones et al. 2005) was even introduced by the authors with an admission that they were ‘not particularly fond of business ethics’ because ‘business ethics in its present form is at best window dressing and a worst a calculated lie’!Ultimately then, developments in the field of business ethics education suggests that business schools and accreditation bodies may be beginning to take the subject more seriously, especially in Europe where something of a momentum appears to be building. However, the future direction of business ethics remains in some doubt. Not only will its integration into the curriculum remain pro blematic for some time yet, but as the subject expands and develops, the approach to teaching business ethics will probably shift quite considerably into new conceptual territory.Whatever the outcome, business ethics will have to go a long way before it presents a completely convincing antidote to corporate wrongdoing, and misconduct in the workplace. Questions 1. What are the main factors encouraging business ethics education and what are the main barriers to its further development and expansion? 2. To what extent can business education cause or prevent ethical infractions in business? Give arguments for and against. 3. Given the importance of situational factors in shaping ethical decision-making, what are the limitations posed by business ethics courses that focus on individual students?How would you design a course to focus primarily on situational issues? 4. Consider the aims and approach of the business ethics course that you are currently studying. What are these, and how ef fective is the approach for achieving these aims? What would you like to see done differently? Sources Alsop, R. 2005. At MBA programs, teaching ethics poses its own dilemmas. Wall Street Journal, 12 April. wsj. com. Boston Globe. 2003. Harvard raises its hand on ethics. Boston Globe, 30 December. Ghoshal, S. 2003.Business schools share the blame for Enron. Financial Times, 18 July. Ghoshal, S. 2005. Bad management theories are destroying good management practices. Academy of Management Learning and Education, 4 (1): 75–91. Jones, C. , Parker, M. , and ten Bos, R. 2005. For business ethics. London: Routledge. Lacy, P. 2005. From the margins to the mainstream: corporate responsibility and the challenge facing business and business schools. Business Leadership Review, 1 (2) (April): 3. Matten, D. and Moon, J. 2004.Corporate social responsibility in Europe. Journal of Business Ethics, 54: 323–37. McDonald, G. M. and Donleavy, G. D. 1995. Objections to the teaching of busi ness ethics. Journal of Business Ethics, 14: 839–53. Mintzberg, H. 2004. Managers not MBAs: a hard look at the soft practice of managing and management development. Harlow: FT Prentice Hall. Swanson, D. and Frederick, W. 2005. Campaign AACSB: status report, January. www. pitt. edu/~rorst6/sim/aacsb. The Economist. 2005. Business schools, bad for business. The Economist, 17 February. Teaching Ethics School for scandal? Business schools turn their attention to ethics education This case examines the role of the business school in encouraging corruption in business, and looks at the potential impacts that business ethics training might have on students. It offers the opportunity to explore the significance of the individual and their education and experience for understanding ethical decision-making. It also provides a context for investigating the specific role, purpose, and impact of business ethics courses on business behaviour.When it turns out that the key figures in some of the most infamous cases of fraud and corruption in business are alumni from leading business schools, it is perhaps not surprising that the business schools themselves might come in for some criticism. After all, if people like Andrew Fastow, the convicted chief financial officer at Enron, or his boss Jeffrey Skilling, could have got MBAs from two of America’s premier business schools (Northwestern and Harvard, respectively) and , then it is inevitable that questions will be raised about what kinds of principles and practices business school students are being taught.In the last few years, a number of business gurus and commentators have publicly condemned business schools in general, and MBA programmes in particular, for their perpetuation of ‘misguided’ amoral theories and techniques, and the lack of attention to ethics in the curriculum.For example, Henry Mintzberg, the Canadian management expert has famously condemned the MBA model, suggesting that it ‘trains the wrong people in the wrong ways with the wrong consequences’, whilst Sumantra Ghoshal, the late London Business School professor has argued that the ‘worst excesses of recent management practices have their roots in a set of ideas that have emerged from business-school academics over the last 30 years. Ghoshal’s ire is directed to typical theories taught at business schools s uch as agency theory and Porter’s ‘5 forces’ model, which he claims perpetuate an idea that everyone is self-interested, managers cannot be trusted, business is a zero-sum game, and shareholder value is the only legitimate aim of business. The perpetuation of such assumptions, he suggests, leaves business school students devoid of any sense of moral responsibility. These criticisms have received a lot of attention in academic debates, but have also been readily recounted in the media and the business community.For instance The Economist ran a 2005 article headlined ‘Business schools stand accused of being responsible for much that is wrong with corporate management today’ which brought the arguments from Ghoshal, Mintzberg, and others to a wider audience – albeit in a context where the magazine rather predictably mounted a strong defence. After all, as The Economist argued, there are plenty of examples of corporate crooks who have not had a bu siness school education, so there are clearly other aspects to consider too.Nevertheless, whatever else the debate has done, it has certainly helped refocus the attention of business schools on their curricula, and especially on the provision of courses on ethics and social responsibility. At one level, this debate is simply about whether more business schools should be encouraged to introduce such courses into the curriculum. Whilst some schools have long included ethics in their curricula, others have tended to focus more on areas such as strategy, innovation, marketing and finance, whilst others have even dropped ethics courses due to low enrolments or political manoeuvring by sceptical colleagues.As one Wall Street Journal article put it, ‘MBA students and professors bristle at ethics requirements. Some faculty members resent being forced to squeeze ethics lessons into an already jam-packed syllabus, while students grumble that ethics classes tend to be preachy and philoso phical. ’ In this context, the evidence on the scale of ethics teaching is revealing. A recent survey of US schools found that 34 per cent required an ethics course at undergraduate level whilst only 25 per cent did so on MBA degrees.In Europe, the figures are if anything a little lower for compulsory courses, but more than 50 per cent of business schools report having an optional module on ethics or responsibility at undergraduate level and more than 30 per cent at masters level. Essentially, though, most business students can still complete a degree having had hardly any exposure to these subjects in the classroom – a situation that some are now trying to change. One development comes from the US, where a long running campaign by business ethics professors has been trying to make courses on ethics and responsibility compulsory for business students.Over 200 professors offered support to the campaign, but the AACSB (the body responsible for accrediting business degree programmes) appears, so far, to be unconvinced. A recent redraft of their guidelines for accreditation did not bow to the campaigners’ demands, and business ethics remains outside of their list of accredited subjects. Diane Swanson and Bill Frederick, the campaign leaders responded by condemning the AACSB’s arguments for excluding ethics as ‘desperate and out of date against the backdrop of unprecedented corporate scandals, increased public distrust of business, and a virtual sea change in corporate governance. However, some leading schools have moved towards greater attention to ethics. Harvard Business School, for instance, introduced a compulsory course on ‘Leadership and Corporate Accountability’ for all first year students in 2004 – a development that the school claimed represented ‘the most far-reaching course we’ve ever introduced on this subject’. In Europe, the situation is also changing, and in fact there appears to be significantly more support than in the US from European accrediting bodies.The Association of MBAs for example, has issued new criteria for the accreditation of MBA programmes that stipulate that the curriculum ‘should pay attention to ethical and social issues’, while the European Foundation for Management Development (EFMD) is also considering ways to integrate CSR into its EQUIS accreditation. New academic departments and centres have also sprung up in universities to lead ethics and responsibility teaching, such as the Business and Society Management department at Rotterdam School of Management and the International Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility in Nottingham University Business School.Whilst there is still a long way to go before schools successfully infuse ethics education across all of their courses, such developments certainly point to an increased emphasis over the past decade. Ethics and corporate responsibility feature far more prominently in the prospectuses of business schools than they did even a few years ago. Questions remain though about how ethics should best be integrated into the curriculum, and even whether exposure to the subject really has a positive effect on the decisions made by managers.While some maintain that a stand alone course on ethics is necessary to develop a suitable understanding of the subject and to consolidate its importance on the curriculum, others argue that this raises the prospects of generating an ‘ethics ghetto’ unconnected to mainstream business subjects such as finance and marketing. And the jury is still out on just how much of an effect any form of ethics training is likely to have on individuals. Various objections have been raised over the years, including the suggestion that students’ morality is already fixed and cannot be improved, and the accusations that ethics teaching is abstract, mbiguous, subjective, and little more than indoctrination from self-r ighteous ideologues. Of course, the extent to which some of these accusations are true will vary from course to course, and on the goals of any specific programme. In the main, evidence suggests that courses are rather better at enhancing students’ recognition of ethical issues, stimulating their moral imagination, and developing their analytical skills rather than improving students’ moral development or changing their values.As one business ethics professor puts it, ‘I do not want to teach moral standards; I want to teach a method of moral reasoning through complex issues so that students can apply the moral standards they have. ’ This highlights another growing debate among business ethics professors about the very purpose of business ethics education – and even what a business ethics course should consist of. Whilst one camp retains belief in the established practice of teaching moral philosophy to develop better normative thinking among student s, other camps have started to emerge.Some business school professors see more need to focus on practical management concerns, such as managing the corporate reputation or preventing accounting fraud, whilst others point to the need to understand ethics within wider social, political, and economic structures. One recent business ethics textbook (by Jones et al. 2005) was even introduced by the authors with an admission that they were ‘not particularly fond of business ethics’ because ‘business ethics in its present form is at best window dressing and a worst a calculated lie’!Ultimately then, developments in the field of business ethics education suggests that business schools and accreditation bodies may be beginning to take the subject more seriously, especially in Europe where something of a momentum appears to be building. However, the future direction of business ethics remains in some doubt. Not only will its integration into the curriculum remain pro blematic for some time yet, but as the subject expands and develops, the approach to teaching business ethics will probably shift quite considerably into new conceptual territory.Whatever the outcome, business ethics will have to go a long way before it presents a completely convincing antidote to corporate wrongdoing, and misconduct in the workplace. Questions 1. What are the main factors encouraging business ethics education and what are the main barriers to its further development and expansion? 2. To what extent can business education cause or prevent ethical infractions in business? Give arguments for and against. 3. Given the importance of situational factors in shaping ethical decision-making, what are the limitations posed by business ethics courses that focus on individual students?How would you design a course to focus primarily on situational issues? 4. Consider the aims and approach of the business ethics course that you are currently studying. What are these, and how ef fective is the approach for achieving these aims? What would you like to see done differently? Sources Alsop, R. 2005. At MBA programs, teaching ethics poses its own dilemmas. Wall Street Journal, 12 April. wsj. com. Boston Globe. 2003. Harvard raises its hand on ethics. Boston Globe, 30 December. Ghoshal, S. 2003.Business schools share the blame for Enron. Financial Times, 18 July. Ghoshal, S. 2005. Bad management theories are destroying good management practices. Academy of Management Learning and Education, 4 (1): 75–91. Jones, C. , Parker, M. , and ten Bos, R. 2005. For business ethics. London: Routledge. Lacy, P. 2005. From the margins to the mainstream: corporate responsibility and the challenge facing business and business schools. Business Leadership Review, 1 (2) (April): 3. Matten, D. and Moon, J. 2004.Corporate social responsibility in Europe. Journal of Business Ethics, 54: 323–37. McDonald, G. M. and Donleavy, G. D. 1995. Objections to the teaching of busi ness ethics. Journal of Business Ethics, 14: 839–53. Mintzberg, H. 2004. Managers not MBAs: a hard look at the soft practice of managing and management development. Harlow: FT Prentice Hall. Swanson, D. and Frederick, W. 2005. Campaign AACSB: status report, January. www. pitt. edu/~rorst6/sim/aacsb. The Economist. 2005. Business schools, bad for business. The Economist, 17 February.

Audit Delay

Pg1Pg1 International Bulletin of Business Administration ISSN: 1451-243X Issue 10 (2011) EuroJournals, Inc. 2011 http://www. eurojournals. com Audit Report Lag and the Effectiveness of Audit Committee Among Malaysian Listed Companies Ummi Junaidda Binti Hashim Universiti Sultan Zainal Abidin E-mail: [email  protected] edu. my Tel: 609-6653760; Fax: 609-6669220 Rashidah Binti Abdul Rahman Accounting Research Institute, Universiti Teknologi Mara Shah Alam E-mail: [email  protected] uitm. edu. my Tel: 603 55444745; Fax: 603 55444921 AbstractThe purpose of this study is to examine the link between audit committee characteristics and audit report lag among 288 companies listed at Bursa Malaysia for a three year period from 2007 to 2009. The characteristics of audit committee examined are audit committee independence, audit committee diligence and audit committee expertise. In this study, audit report lag refers to the number of days from the company’? s year end (financial year ) to the date of auditor’? s report. The results of this study show that audit report lag for the listed companies in Malaysia ranges from 36 days to 184 days for the three year period.The results of this study also show that audit committee independence and audit committee expertise could assist in reducing audit report lag among companies in Malaysia. This study however could not provide any evidence on the link between audit committee diligence on audit report lag. Overall, the findings in this study provide some evidence supporting the resource based theory, whereby characteristics of the audit committee as the resources and capabilities could improve companies’? performance as well as corporate reporting. Keywords: Audit Committee, Audit Report Lag 1.Introduction Financial reporting in general will provide useful information and assist users in decision making as capacity of capital providers in companies. Particularly users rely on the audited financial reports i n their assessment and evaluation of companies’? performance. The audited financial reports will increase its reliability and users will feel affirm on the reports verified by the auditors and would be able to make decision wisely (FASB, Concepts Statement 2). Timeliness itself will enhance the usefulness of the information. There are many ways to define timeliness.Commonly known that timeliness is the reporting delay from the company’? s accounting year end to the date of the audit report completed (Chambers and Penman, 1984). Audit report lag would lead the shareholders and potential shareholders to postpone their transaction on shares (Ng and Tai, 1994). This in turn, would provide negative effect to the company. 50 Pg2Pg2 Bursa Malaysia1 has demanded for timely financial reporting through the provision of Chapter 2 and Chapter 9 of the Listing Requirements (2009), Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad.Bursa Malaysia listing requirement under chapter 9. 23 (a) provides t hat a public listed companies must submit its annual report to Bursa Malaysia within six months after the company’? s year end. To prevent companies from late submission of their audited financial reports, Bursa Malaysia in consultation with Securities Commission has imposed penalty to public listed companies for failure to disclose the material facts such as the annual report within the time frame. However, despite the penalty being imposed, there are companies that could not meet the submission deadline.This current scenario as reported in Bursa Malaysia website 2010 (www. bursamalaysia. com). Many professional and regulatory bodies have taken various actions to identify the factors that hinder companies in delaying the submission of financial reports. Bursa Malaysia highlighted that corporate governance mechanisms which is audit committee would play a significant role in the company to ensure that the objective of Bursa Malaysia on timely reporting can be achieved. The ame nded Bursa Malaysia Listing requirement in 2009 provides that the members of audit committee must not be less than 3 persons.All members of the audit committee must be non-executive directors, with a majority of them being independent directors and at least one member is a member of the Malaysia Institute of Accountants (MIA). If the member of the audit committee is not a member of MIA, the member must have at least three years of working experience. Malaysian Government has recommended Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG, 2000) which was later revised in 2007. The revised code recommends that member of audit committee to comprise of fully non-executive directors, be able to read, analyse and interpret financial statements.This is to ensure that they would be able to effectively discharge their functions. Since audit committee has a close working relationship with external auditors, the audit committee would able to assist the level of audit coverage and assurance. This cou ld be done by employing knowledgeable members in the audit committee (Abbott et al. 2003), thus, would improve timeliness and reduce audit report lag. Past studies that have examined the determinants of audit report lag among companies focused only on company’? specific variables such as company size, (Al-Ajmi, 2008), profitability (Ahmad and Kamarudin, 2003), year end (Ahmed, 2003); leverage (Owusu-Ansah and Leventis, 2006), industry type (Jaggi and Tsui, 1999), audit opinion (Ng and Tai, 1994), and type of auditor (Afify, 2009). However, these studies did not examine corporate governance mechanisms in relation to audit report lag. Afify (2009) and Tauringana (2008) examined the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on audit report lag. Both studies were conducted in a non-Malaysian setting.Within the Malaysian context, studies that have examined the issue of timeliness using firm’? s specific variable include those by Ahmad and Kamarudin (2003) and Che-Ahmad and Abidin (2008). These two studies did not examine the issue of timeliness in relation to corporate governance mechanism. The current study extends the corporate governance literature by examining the issue of timeliness of annual reports in the Malaysian market by incorporating corporate governance, firm’? s specific variables in relation to audit report lag.The aim of the current study is to examine whether the existence of audit committee could assist in reducing audit report lag. Such examination is important since the audit literature has identified the role of audit committee in reviewing the financial statement. This study aims to answer the following research question: â€Å"? Could audit committee play an important role in effectively monitoring the timeliness of audit report? This study contributes to the corporate governance and audit literature by examining association of corporate governance; audit committee and the audit report lag.The findings of the study would have policy implications for MCCG. It provides supporting evidence on whether the development of corporate governance could significantly increase the timeliness of annual reports among companies in Malaysia. This study could assist Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance 1 Bursa Malaysia was previously known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. 51 Pg3Pg3 (MICG) to provide best practice in order to enhance corporate governance mechanisms. The findings could also assist external auditors in evaluating the effectiveness of the audit committee in their audit planning.Such assistance would assist the external auditors in identifying the best time to be allocated for their audit engagements in terms of effort such as whether to reduce or increase effort and the amount of fees to be charged. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, it discusses on literature review and hypotheses development. Next, it describes on research design to conduct the study. It further provides the results of the analysis and discussion. The final part concludes and provides suggestions for future research. 2. Literature Review and Hypotheses DevelopmentWithin the corporate governance mechanisms, audit committee plays an important role in the monitoring process as well as its reporting role in companies. These members would reduce auditors’? task complexity and increase timeliness. Therefore, arguably, audit committee would be able to reduce audit report lag. This is because the appointment of audit committee are in line with the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) where agents act on behalf of principles in ensuring the company is performing well and provides quality annual reporting.The following sections develop three hypotheses to meet the objectives of the study which are related to the characteristics of audit committee. 2. 1. Audit Committee Independence According to the agency theory, the independent members in audit committee could help the principals to monitor the agents’? activities and reduce benefits from withholding information. This is because audit committee with more independent directors is considered as being a more reliable group other than board of directors in monitoring the company.The effective role provides by audit committee would be appropriate to represent the rights and privileges for all stakeholders. An independent audit committee enhances the effectiveness of monitoring function since it serves as a reinforcing agent to the independence of internal and external auditors in a company. Menon and Williams (1994) posits that an audit committee must comprise entirely of independent directors in order to be more effective. Klein (2002) shows that independent audit committees reduce the likelihood of earnings management, thus improving transparency.Carcello et al. (2000) found that audit committee independence have positive significant relationship with audit fees. This provides evidence that independence of the audit committee would lead to higher quality of financial report. Further, Ismail et al. (2008) found that the independence of audit committee would not influence the quality reporting of the companies. They argue that this is due to the companies only fulfilling the requirements, rather than the impact of the requirements. In contrast, Ali Shah et al. 2009) found that companies in Pakistan are having good corporate governance through having independence of audit committee. Bursa Malaysia Listing requirements (2009) and MCCG (2007) have highlighted that the audit committee might institute stronger internal control and good monitoring of financial reporting process in a company. The strong internal control managed by audit committee would lead to auditors reducing their work on the company’? s accounts because of their reliance on the internal control of the company. This would subsequently lead to the decrease in audit delay.Therefore, the first hypothesis is develope d. H1: There is negative relationship between the audit committee independence and audit report lag. 52 Pg4Pg4 2. 2. Audit Committee Diligence Ismail et al. (2008), measure audit committee diligence based on actual number of audit committee meetings held in a year. Audit committee meetings are considered as an important tool in ensuring audit committee members are fulfilling their responsibilities towards the company. Audit committee must carry out activities effectively through increased frequency of meetings in order to maintain its control functions (Bedard et al. 2004). Abbott et al. 2000) in their examination found that audit committee that meets at least twice annually is subjected to less exposure of sanction by the authorities. This is because regular meetings conducted would indicate that the audit committee discharges their duties in a well manner as an agent in the company. They also noted that audit committee that is wholly independent is also active by way of having mee tings. Dechow et al. (1996) argue that audit committee is an integral part of a company that emphasises high level monitoring. Moreover, the monitoring function would be more effective in terms of financial reporting.American Bar Association posits that an audit committee which holds less than 2 meetings annually is considered not committed to their duties. This indicates that the audit committee is unable to contribute to the internal control in that situation. Auditors who really monitor the internal control function of the company would reduce their works. However, Ismail et al. (2008) found that frequency of audit committee meeting could not influence the quality reporting of the companies. They argue that this is due to the companies only fulfilling the requirements, rather than the impact of the requirements.Razman and Iskandar (2004) found Malaysian companies that have good reporting meet more frequent than poor reporting companies. This is because, during the meeting, they c an monitor the management activities. Of consequence, this will lead to the decrease time taken on auditing by the auditors and reduce the reporting lag. Therefore, following hypothesis is developed. H2: There is negative relationship between audit committee diligence and audit report lag. 2. 3. Audit Committee Expertise Audit committee expertise is important in order to deal effectively with external auditors.This is because audit committee typically acts as the mediator between the management and the auditors. DeZoort et al. (2003) note that audit committee members with experience in financial reporting and auditing especially those who are CPAs would understand auditors’? tasks and responsibilities. They would become more supportive of the auditors compared to audit committee members who do not have similar experience. Audit committee members who are experts are more ‘? friendly’? with the auditors, comprehensible, logical and coherent when they are discussing with the auditors regarding the financial reporting of the company.Audit committee with more expertise would be more concerned about the financial reporting quality of the company. DeZoort (1998) contends that an audit committee with more internal control experience makes decisions or judgments similar to auditors compared to those audit committee members who are without experience. This reflects that experience in the accounting, internal control or auditing is fundamental to enable the audit committee to understand and cater on the problematic issue on the financial reporting system of the company. They would also realise the benefits of producing financial statement on time at the market.It is also identified that audit committee with financial expertise are going to facilitate each other. As discussed in resource based theory, the resources and capabilities that audit committee posses with financial expertise may assist in improving the firm performance. Listed companies in Mal aysia that have financial literate members of audit committee would have ability to end up with good financial report (Razman and Iskandar, 2004). This is because audit committee who has knowledge in accounting and auditing is able to demonstrate their ability in monitoring of internal control and reporting.Strong internal control also would lead the auditors in 53 Pg5Pg5 reducing their work because of their reliance on the credibility of the internal control. Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed: H3: There is negative relationship between the audit committee expertise and the audit report lag. 3. Research Design Sample covered in this study are among 288 companies listed at Bursa Malaysia for three years from 2007 to 2009. The samples are chosen randomly from 806 of the population. Table 1: Total number of companies and sample based on industry IndustryPopulationSample of companiesPercentConstruction49197 Consumer1395318 Hotel521 Industrial2658830 Infrastructure731 Prop erty883111 Plantation43166 Technology29124 Trading & services1816422 TOTAL806288100 The companies listed at Bursa Malaysia are selected for this study because they are governed by the rules and regulations imposed by MCCG and Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements. The companies selected include consumer, industrial products, trading and services, construction, infrastructure, hotel, property, technology and plantation. Table 1 provides the number of companies selected from each of the sector.There are seven operational variables which comprise of one dependent variable, three independent variables and three control variables as describe in Table 2. Table 2: Variables Measurements VariablesDefinition Dependent ARLAudit report lag Independent ACINDAC independence ACMEETAC meeting (ACdiligence) ACEXPAC expertise (AC experience) Control SIZECompany size AUDIT TYPEType of audit firm PROFProfitability Measurement Represents the number of days elapsing between the end of the fiscal year of t he company to the completion of the audit for the current year for each individual firm (the audit report date)Percentage of non-executive directors to the total of audit committee members Number of audit committee meeting No of audit committee member with background experience in financial reporting (such as MIA,MICPA) to the total of audit committee members. Natural log of year end total assets Dummy variable, ‘? 1’? if auditor is one of the former Big-4 audit firms, ‘? 0’? otherwise PROF = Return on asset, measured by net income divided with total assets 54 Pg6Pg6 4. Results 4. 1. Descriptive Statistic Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Audit Report Lag (N= 288) YearNMinimumMaximumMeanMedian 2007ARL28840. 00184. 00103. 14110. 50 008ARL28840. 00146. 00103. 42111. 00 2009ARL28836. 00136. 00102. 46110. 00 2007- 2009ARL86436. 00184. 00103. 00111. 00 Notes: ARL = number of days between the end of the fiscal year to the date of completion of audit As shown in Table 3, the mean score of audit report lag for the pooled sample is 103 days with a maximum and minimum days of 184 and 36 respectively. This indicates that on average, the companies took 103 days to complete their audit report. Using the pooled sample from period from period 2007 to 2009, the results indicate that the companies did comply with Bursa Malaysia listing requirements and he Companies act where they submit their report within six months except for one company which took 184 days to submit the report. It shows that companies are improving over the years on the number of days taken to complete the annual reports. The results of this study are somewhat similar to Afify (2009) that found the maximum and mean score number of days to complete the annual report was 115 days and 67 days respectively. The results indicate that the number of days that the companies took to complete the audit report has reduced from 2007-2009 by 48 days. Results on previous study show relative di fference with the current study.Che-Ahmad and Abidin (2008) found that 442 days while Ahmad and Kamarudin (2003) reveal 273 days on the maximum of days to complete the annual report. Table 4: Number of companies and audit report lag for 2007 – 2009 Audit report lagNo. ofNo. ofNo. of ARL (within)companiescompaniescompanies Year / percentage2007Percent2008Percent2009Percent 1 month (30 days)00. 0000. 0000. 00 2 months (60days)227. 64206. 94258. 68 3 months (90days)4214. 584114. 244114. 24 4 months (120days)19868. 7521173. 2620872. 22 5 months (150days)258. 68165. 56144. 86 6 months (180days)00. 0000. 0000. 00More than 180days10. 3500. 0000. 00 Total288100288100288100 Table 4 shows that for the three year period, no company has completed and submitted their annual report within a month. The results also show that for the three year period, 41 to 42 companies have completed and submitted their annual report within 3 months. None of the companies have submitted their audit reports exceeding 6 months except for one company which managed to submit their audited report only after 184 days in year 2007. The results in Table 4 shows that most companies reports way ahead the date stipulated by Chapter 9 (9. 3a) of Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement that the annual report shall be issued and submitted within a period not exceeding 6 months from the financial year end of the company. Such results indicated that the companies are concerned and realised that audited reports are useful for users’? 55 Pg7Pg7 decision-making. The results support the notion that excessive delay in publishing financial statements would increase uncertainty in relation to investment decisions(Ashton et al. 1987; Ahmad and Kamarudin, 2003). Table 5: Descriptive statistic for Audit Committee Characteristics and Control VariablesIndependent VariableNMinimumMaximumMeanMedianStd. Deviation ACIND8640. 601. 000. 931. 000. 18 ACDIL8641. 0012. 004. 845. 001. 67 ACEXP8640. 001. 000. 400. 330. 19 Control variable SIZE TOTASSET (RM BILLION)8649 -336. 640. 790. 242. 86 TYPEAUD864010. 580. 000. 49 PROFITABILITY864-1. 8811. 0590. 030. 030. 40 Notes: ACINDP= percentage of non-executive directors to the total of audit committee members ACDIL= number of audit committee meeting ACEXP= no of audit committee member with background experience in financial reporting TOTASSET= total assets that the companies have at the end of the financial year.TYPEAUD= ‘? 1’? if audited by Big-4, ‘? 0’? if otherwise PROFITABILITY= net income divided with total assets Table 5 presents the characteristics of the audit committee among the listed companies. The results show that audit committee independence (ACIND) has a mean score 93 percent. The results also show that the listed companies minimum score of 60 percent of their audit committee member being represented by independent directors. The results indicate that the companies comply with the Bursa Malaysia listing require ment (2009) which requires a company to have majority of the audit committee members being ndependent directors. Although the requirement of Bursa Malaysia on the number of independent directors in a board of directors is different from MCCG’? s (2007) requirement, the requirement of Bursa Malaysia listing requirement prevails MCCG’? s requirements2. Table 5 also presents the results on the number of meetings held by the audit committee. The results show that almost all audit committee in the listed companies discharge their duties appropriately in which on average 5 meetings were being held.The highest number of meeting held by the audit committee during the three year period was 12 times. MCCG (2007) provides that companies should have their audit committee meeting at least 4 times a year. Table 5 also shows the mean score of audit committee expertise (ACEXP) as 0. 4 (40 percent). Such results indicate that most audit committee in the listed companies have audit comm ittee members with experience in financial reporting. Only 24 of the companies (2. 78 percent) formed their audit committee with members not having accounting qualification.The later results did not comply with requirements of Bursa Malaysia listing requirements and MCCG that states at least one member of the audit committee must fulfill the financial expertise requisite. In fact, two companies for the three year period have yet to comply with the requirement to have one of the audit committee members’? with financial expertise. 4. 2. Correlation Matrix Analysis Table 6 shows a non-significant value (0. 333) which is more than 0. 05, indicating data normality. Based on Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro Wilk tests, this study concludes that audit report lag is normally distributed. MCCG (2007) provides that, all members of the audit committee should be non-executive directors. 56 Pg8Pg8 Table 6: Normality Test for Audit Report Lag Kolmogorov-SmirnovaShapiro-Wilk StatisticdfSig. S tatisticdfSig. NARL0. 0348640. 0210. 9988640. 333 a. Lilliefors Significance Correction Table 7 shows no correlation problem among the variables since the value is less than 0. 5. The variance inflation factor (VIF) indicates all variables have a value below two which is within the acceptable range of 10. Table 7: Correlation Matrix Table ARLACDILACINDACEXPLog_AssetTYPEAUDROA ARL1 ACDIL0. 096**1 ACIND-0. 68*0. 0301 ACEXP-0. 0190. 0220. 0131 LOG_ASSET-0. 170**0. 093**0. 078*-0. 0031 TYPE AUD-0. 170**-0. 088**0. 010-0. 0210. 195**1 ROA-0. 076*0. 0330. 029-0. 032-0. 0210. 0061 **Correlation is significant at the 0. 01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0. 05 level (2-tailed) Notes: ACINDP= percentage of non-executive directors to the total of audit committee members ACDIL= number of audit committee meeting ACEXP= no of audit committee member with background experience in financial reporting LOG_ASSET= natural log of total assets (in billions of ringgit Malaysia) TYPE AUD= ‘? 1’? f audited by Big-4, ‘? 0’? if otherwise ROA= net income divided with total assets 4. 3. Fixed Panel Regression This section presents the results of the fixed panel regression using Eviews. The panel data analysis is an increasingly popular form of longitudinal data analysis among social and behavioral science researchers (Hsiao, 2003). A panel is a cross-section or group of people who are surveyed periodically over a given time period. In this study, the group is the listed companies selected and the time is the duration of the data collected, which is the three year period of 2007 until 2009.Since the data is bound to be heterogeneity, the panel data technique could take such heterogeneity explicitly into account by allowing individual specific variables (Gujarati, 2003). Normal regression does not adjust firm’? s specific effect which would lead to variables being omitted and mis-specified the model (Fraser et al. 2005). Fixed effect mo del could overcome such problem by adjusting the effects through firm’? s specific intercept by capturing immeasurable firm’? s specific characteristics (Fraser et al. 2005). Panel data provides more informative of data, variability and efficiency.Under the panel data, the model is generated as follows: ARL = 1ACINDP + 2ACMEET + 3ACEXP + 4SIZE+ 5AUDTYPE + 6PROF + it Table 8: Fixed Panel Regression Result VariableCoefficientProb. ACIND-0. 0217060. 001* ACDIL-0. 0098350. 899 ACEXP-0. 0400840. 001* LOG_ASSET-0. 1297820. 012* ROA-0. 0021460. 264 TYPEAUD0. 0025350. 294 C5. 7867340. 000 N864 57 Pg9Pg9 Table 8: Fixed Panel Regression Result – continued Adjusted R-squared0. 802562 F-statistic12. 811 Prob(F-statistic)0. 000 Notes: ACINDP= percentage of non-executive directors to the total of audit committee members ACDIL=number of audit committee meetingACEXP= no of audit committee member with background experience in financial reporting LOG_ASSET= natural log of to tal assets (in billions of ringgit Malaysia) TYPEAUD= ‘? 1’? if audited by Big-4, ‘? 0’? if otherwise ROA= net income divided with total assets Adjusted R2= adjusted R2 coefficient determination F stat= indicate how much variation is explained by the regression equation. *significant at 1%. Table 8 shows that the audit committee independence (ACINDP) and audit committee expertise (ACEXP) are significant at 1% level. Thus, accepting hypotheses one and three respectively.On the other hand, the results show that there is no relationship between audit committee diligence and audit report lag. Therefore, hypothesis two is rejected. The results indicate that audit committee independence and audit committee expertise may reduce on audit report lag but audit committee diligence could not influence audit report lag. Carcello et al. (2000) found that audit committee independence and audit committee expertise have significant relationship with audit fee while audit co mmittee diligence did not provide any relationship on audit fees.The results in this study shows significant relationship between audit independence and audit report lag which is similar to Klein (2002) that found that more independent audit committee members would effectively influence financial reporting quality. The results of this study support the view that audit committee with a simple majority of independent audit committee members are more likely to fulfill its duties effectively compared to an audit committee members that have no independent audit committee members.This is consistent with agency theory where independent members in an audit committee could assist principals to monitor the agents’? activities and reduce benefits from withholding information. They would have had provided more effective roles in monitoring the companies. Further, the number of financial experts on audit committee will reduce incident of fraud (Farber, 2005). A member with financial exper tise demonstrate a high level of financial reporting knowledge and thus expected to lead the committee, identify and ask knowledgeable questions that challenge management and external auditor (He et al. 009). In practice, it is a general belief that more meeting and discussion of the committee would improve the performance of the company. However, similar to the study done by Uzun et al. (2004), the results in this study show that the number of audit committee meeting held is not significantly associated with audit report lag. More frequent meeting that the company has does not necessarily provide better achievement to the companies. Thus, the company needs to ensure audit committee member raised and resolved issues with management during the meeting, and as a result improve the quality of reporting. . Conclusion The results of this study show that audit committee characteristics: audit committee independence and audit committee expertise contribute as important factors that affect audit report lag of the companies. Such results correspond to the resource based theory where those characteristics of audit committee as the resources and capabilities that may improve companies’? performance as well as on the corporate 58 Pg10Pg10 reporting.These two characteristics represent the Bursa Malaysia listing requirement that require audit committee compose of not fewer than 3 members with majority of them being independent directors and requires at least one member of the audit committee to have financial expertise requisite. Audit committees with those characteristics could assist the companies to be timely in their annual reporting. Finally, this study could not find significant link between audit committee meeting to audit report lag.This study suggests that audit committee could prioritise important things that need to be resolved during the meeting in order to improve the performance of the company as well as in assuring audit report lag. This study is not w ithout limitations. This study does not include other factors such as government policy or political issue that also might affect audit report lag. McGee (2007) noted that the influence of timeliness might be attributed by culture, political and economic system of the country.Secondly, covering a bigger sample would provide greater generalization on the Malaysian listed companies on audit report lag and corporate governance characteristics. Finally, this study only covers a three year period from 2007 until 2009. A longer period such as ten year period data would be more interesting as it can show the trend on audit report lag. For future research avenues, a possibility is to examine other corporate governance mechanisms; characteristics of board of directors in assuring audit report lag.Future research can also examine which parties are liable for the delay of annual report, either on the hands of the preparers or auditors. References [1] Abdul Rahman, R. and Mohamed Ali F. H. , 20 06. â€Å"? Board, audit committee, culture and earnings management: Malaysian evidence†?. Managerial Auditing Journal, 21 (7), 783-804. [2] Abtott, L. J. , Parker, S. , Peter, G. F and Raghunandan, K. , 2003. â€Å"? The association between audit committee characteristics and audit fees†?. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 22 (2, 17-32. [3] Abbott, L. J. and S. Parker. , 2000. â€Å"?Auditor selection and audit committee characteristics†?. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory. 19 (2), 47-66. [4]Afify, H. A. E. ,2009. Determinants of audit report lag: Does implementing corporate governance have any impact? Empirical evidence form Egypt. Journal of Applied Accounting Research, 10(1), 56-86. [5] Ahmad, R. A. R. and Kamarudin, K. A. , 2003. â€Å"? Audit delay and the timeliness of corporate reporting: Malaysian evidence†?. Working paper, MARA University of Technology, Shah Alam. [6] Ahmed, K. , 2003. â€Å"? 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W. , 2007. â€Å"? Corporate governance and timeliness of financial reporting: a case study of Russian energy sector†?. Working paper, Barry University, Miami Shores, USA. [36] Menon, K. , and Williams, J. D. , 1994. â€Å"? The use of audit committees for monitoring†?.Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 13, 121-139. 60 Pg12Pg12 [37] Mohd Ghazali, N. A. ,2010. â€Å"? Ownership structure, corporate governance and corporate performance in Malaysia†?. International Journal of Commerce and Management, 20, (2), 109- 119. [38] Ng, P. H. and Tai, Y. K. , 1994. â€Å"? An empirical examination of the determinants of audit delay in Hong Kong†?. British Accounting Review, 26, 43-59. [39] Owusu-Ansah, S. and Leventis, S. , 2006. â€Å"? Timeliness of corporate annual financial reporting in Greece†? , European Accounting Review, 15, 273-287. [40] Razman, S.R. , and Iskandar M. T. , 2004. â€Å"? 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Strategic Interagency Board On International Climate...

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